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ABSTRACT: In a competitive information market, a single information source can only dominate 
other sources individually, not collectively. We explore whether earnings announcements constitute such a 
dominant source using Ball and Shivakumar’s (2008) R2 metric: the proportion of the variation in annual 
returns explained by the four quarterly earnings announcement returns. We find that the earnings 
announcement days’ R2 is 11 percent—higher than the corresponding R2 of days with dividend 
announcements, management forecasts, preannouncements, 10-K and 10-Q filings, and their 
amendments, and comparable to that of the four days with largest realized absolute return in a year. 
Additional analysis reveals that earnings announcements convey extreme bad news as often as 
management forecasts and preannouncements; for any other type of news earnings announcements are 
much more frequent. We conclude that earnings announcements are an important source of new 
information in the equity market. 
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1. Introduction 
Many accounting researchers have lamented the low information content of earnings announcements (e.g., 
Ball and Brown, 1968; Lev, 1989; Bamber, Christensen, and Gaver, 2000; Ball and Shivakumar, 2008; Beyer, 
Cohen, Lys, and Walther, 2010). Some have called for regulation to make earnings more informative (Lev, 1989), 
while others have inferred that the primary role of reported earnings is perhaps not to provide new information to the 
equity market (Ball and Shivakumar, 2008; Beyer et al., 2010). Market participants, however, track earnings 
announcement dates and discuss the contents of earnings releases in great depth in analyst reports, industry 
publications, and the like. Market participants’ keen attention suggests that earnings releases convey a lot of new 
information.  
We seek to reconcile these two divergent views. We suggest that the academic perspective is shaped by 
statistical comparisons of earnings announcements to other information sources collectively whereas the practitioner 
view is likely based on comparing earnings announcements to other information sources individually. We adapt Ball 
and Shivakumar’s (2008) information content metric—the R2 from a regression of calendar-year returns on the four 
quarterly earnings announcement returns—to test our basic hypothesis that earnings announcements dominate other 
information events individually.  
Our empirical analyses explore whether earnings announcement days’ R2 is greater than that of other days 
associated with increased arrival of information. In particular, we compare it to three sets of benchmarks: the R2s of 
(1) days on which firms announce dividends, (2) high-information arrival days, defined as days with the largest 
realized absolute returns in a firm-year, and (3) days on which firms disseminate earnings information through other 
channels: management forecasts, earnings preannouncements, initial 10-K and 10-Q filings, or 10-K and 10-Q 
amendments.1 The second benchmark is especially pertinent for assessing whether earnings announcements are a 
superior information source; days with the largest realized absolute returns are the days on which the largest 
amounts of information arrive, from any source (or combination of sources) and of any type. 
Ball and Shivakumar (2008) use management forecast days’ R2 as a benchmark, but they estimate this R2 
only using firm-quarters that contain management forecasts. Their approach ignores firm-quarters where the 
benchmark information source remains silent and does not contribute to the annual flow of information. In our view, 
the average R2 using this approach greatly overstates the overall importance of sources that disseminate information 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1616466
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infrequently. We therefore present R2s corresponding to two approaches: one in which we analyze only firm-years 
where a benchmark information source disseminated information in all four quarters, and another in which we “fill 
in” missing event returns with daily returns drawn randomly from the quarters in which that particular event is 
missing. 
Our key findings are as follows: The mean earnings announcement days’ R2 of 11.08 percent, estimated on 
a sample of firm-years with exactly four earnings announcements per year, is economically larger than the average 
R2 for four randomly chosen days of 2.97 percent and is virtually equivalent to that for 16 randomly chosen days, 
which suggests an earnings announcement day is four times as informative as a typical trading day. It is also 
economically larger than dividend announcement days’ R2 of 7.25 percent estimated on a sample of firm-years with 
exactly four dividend announcements. More importantly, the mean earnings announcement days’ R2 is virtually the 
same as that of high-information arrival days when the latter are chosen from all days including earnings 
announcement days (10.76 percent), and about 30 percent higher when earnings announcement days are excluded 
(8.50 percent). We infer that earnings announcements are a dominant source of information in the equity market 
because no other four days account for a larger proportion of the total variation in annual returns. However, because 
the R2 of earnings announcement days is less than 50 percent, these events do not surpass all other information 
events collectively. 
Management forecasts and earnings preannouncements appear to be superior sources of information when 
we analyze only the firm-years in which they occur, consistent with the findings of Ball and Shivakumar (2008). For 
the subsamples in which management forecasts and preannouncements occur, we document R2s of 20.87 percent and 
20.46 percent; but in the full sample that includes non-announcing firm-quarters, these R2s drop steeply to 5.70 
percent and 3.69 percent respectively.  In sum, accounting for the lower frequency of earnings preannouncements 
and management forecasts reverses our inferences—preannouncements and management forecasts are now revealed 
to be inferior information sources.2  
Finally, we explore how often earnings announcements, preannouncements, and management forecasts 
(when they occur) convey large amounts of information to the market.3 We pool the distributions of earnings 
announcement returns, preannouncement returns, and management forecast returns to form a single return 
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distribution, and partition it into 30 bins of equal width. We then examine the relative frequencies of the three events 
in the outermost bins containing the largest price-impact announcements.   
To our surprise, the frequency of earnings announcements in the leftmost bin (biggest negative returns) is 
comparable to that of preannouncements and management forecasts combined whereas earnings announcements in 
the rightmost bin (biggest positive returns) occur ten times as often as preannouncements and management forecasts 
combined. We conclude that earnings announcements are at least as important as preannouncements or management 
forecasts in delivering extreme bad news to the market; for any other type of news earnings announcements 
thoroughly dominate.4 
Our study articulates and reconciles two opposing views about the importance of earnings announcements 
by showing that earnings announcements dominate other information sources individually, but not collectively. Our 
evidence counters academic claims that the purpose of reported earnings is not to provide new information, but to 
facilitate contracting (Ball and Shivakumar, 2008). In particular, the proportion of the total variation in annual 
returns accounted for by earnings announcement days, 11 percent, is nearly the same as that accounted for by the 
four days in a year with the largest realized absolute returns. This evidence suggests that a belief that earnings 
announcements are not important enough is virtually identical to a belief that the four most extreme returns in a year 
are not extreme enough, which we find somewhat absurd.5 
Our study’s basic point is that a competitive information market makes it impossible for earnings 
announcements, or any information source for that matter, to dominate other information sources collectively. 
However, earnings announcements might still dominate other sources individually, which is reminiscent of Patell’s 
(1989) pointed critique of Lev (1989): The failure of earnings news to explain earnings announcement returns arises 
from the general difficulty of explaining daily returns, and thus, is not a symptom of a broken financial reporting 
model. From our perspective, earnings announcements appear unimportant in explaining annual returns precisely 
because the competitive equity market aggregates information produced, disseminated, and acted upon by all market 
participants (companies, investors, regulators, the media, etc.) in the economy (Hayek, 1945). 
Our main point is also relevant to research on earnings timeliness. Typically, researchers document a weak 
long-window earnings-returns relation and conclude that earnings lack timeliness or have low quality (e.g., Lev, 
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1989). We suggest that the informativeness of earnings is best assessed against benchmarks that allow for the 
existence of a competitive information market. 
The next section discusses conceptual and empirical challenges in assessing how informative earnings 
announcements are in a competitive information market, as well as how we resolve these challenges. Sections 3 and 
4 compare the R2 of earnings announcement days (EADs henceforth) to the R2s of four typical days and of four 
high-information arrival days, respectively. Section 5 concludes our discussion. 
 
2. Assessing the role of earnings announcements as an information source 
2.1 The Ball and Shivakumar (2008) metric 
Ball and Shivakumar (2008) conduct cross-sectional regressions of annual returns on the four quarterly 
earnings announcement returns. Specifically, their regression model is:  
 
 Ri (annual) = a0 + a1Ri (window1) + a2Ri (window2) + a3Ri (window3) + a4Ri (window4) + εi             (1) 
 
where Ri (window j) refers to the buy-and-hold return for firm i over a three-day window centered on the EAD in 
calendar quarter j of a given year, while Ri (annual) is the annual buy-and-hold return for firm i for the same 
calendar year. 
As Ball and Shivakumar (2008) explain, “The regression adjusted R2 measures the proportion of the annual 
return variability associated with the four earnings event windows.” Intuitively, the R2 reveals how much of the 
annual flow of information is accounted for by information arriving on EADs. This interpretation follows from the 
proposition that the variation in returns over a particular window reflects the variation in the amount of information 
arriving in this window (Beaver, 1968).6  
The Ball and Shivakumar (2008) measure resembles one employed by Smith 2007: the ratio of the sum of 
squared announcement returns to the sum of squared daily returns for the whole year. This is because summing 
squared daily returns over EADs (over the calendar year) estimates the variance of earnings announcement returns 
(calendar-year returns). We favor the Ball and Shivakumar (2008) metric because it allows for non-zero covariances 
between returns on EADs and non-EADs. In particular, if returns on EADs do not fully impound information 
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arriving on these days (e.g., Bernard and Thomas, 1989, 1990), the resulting positive covariance with returns on 
non-EADs will lead to a higher R2, with no effect on Smith’s (2007) measure. Conversely, if returns on EADs are 
negatively correlated with returns on non-EADs, then the resulting R2 would be lower, again with no effect on 
Smith’s (2007) measure.7 In the extreme case of zero serial correlation in daily returns, the Ball and Shivakumar 
(2008) R2 metric converges to Smith’s (2007) metric: the ratio of the variance of earnings announcement returns to 
the variance of annual returns. In this special case, all slope coefficients will converge to 1. 
Both measures modify Beaver’s (1968) research design, which seeks to measure the increase in return 
variance induced by the earnings announcement.8 Beaver (1968) relates the return variance in annual earnings 
announcement weeks to the return variance in 16 nearby non-earnings announcement weeks, as well as a non-report 
period consisting of all other remaining weeks in the year. In contrast, by relating the variance of earnings 
announcement returns to the variance of annual return, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) and Smith (2007) seek to 
measure how much earnings announcements contribute to the (total) annual flow of information. The change in 
research objectives determines the different metrics used in these more recent papers. 
  
2.2 Debate on the importance of earnings announcements 
Ball and Shivakumar (2008) document an R2 of 11 percent, larger than the 4.8 percent theoretical value 
under the hypothesis that the four quarterly EADs are informationally equivalent to four typical days, but much 
smaller than the 100 percent value consistent with a hypothesis that earnings announcements constitute the only 
source of information.9 They also find that management earnings forecasts produce an R2 that is more than twice 
that of earnings announcements. They attribute the higher R2 to management forecasts being forward-looking and 
voluntary whereas earnings announcements are backward-looking and mandatory. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) 
conclude that earnings announcements are a marginal source of new information and that “the primary economic 
role of reported earnings is not to provide timely new information to the share market”. 
Many other researchers also conclude that earnings announcements convey little new information to the 
equity market. Ball and Brown (1968) find that 85 percent to 90 percent of the information in annual earnings is 
anticipated by the stock market before the earnings announcement month, and most of the earnings announcement 
month return is unrelated to earning news, leading them to infer that most of the information in annual earnings 
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announcements is not timely.10 Lev (1989) finds that earnings news explains between 2 percent and 5 percent of the 
variation in earnings announcement returns and arrives at a similar conclusion.11 Bamber et al. (2000) argue that 
Beaver’s (1968) non-random sample overstates the importance of earnings announcements. They compute weekly 
return variances for the 17-week period centered on the annual earnings announcement week, and document that 
10.8 percent of firms have their highest return variance in the earnings announcement week, and 7.5 percent of firms 
have their second highest return variance in the earnings announcement week. Bamber et al. (2000) interpret these 
two proportions as being economically indistinguishable from 5.8 percent (= 100 percent ÷ 17), the value expected 
under the null hypothesis that earnings announcement weeks are identical to other weeks.  
The behavior of financial analysts, commentators, and reporters tacitly reveals a more favorable opinion of 
earnings announcements as an information source in the equity markets. Reported earnings and the market reactions 
they trigger are discussed ad nauseum in equity analyst research reports, commentaries in industry publications, and 
the financial press. Researchers also use earnings announcements to study a wide range of market phenomena.12 
How can we resolve the contradiction between Ball and Shivakumar’s (2008) view, shared by several 
prominent accounting researchers, of earnings announcements as a marginal source of new information and the 
attention market participants lavish on earnings releases? One possibility is that this attention is unwarranted. 
Another possibility is that earnings announcements are a superior information source that dominates all or most 
other information sources individually, but not necessarily collectively. As an analogy, The New York Times and The 
Wall Street Journal are widely regarded as influential newspapers, but their market shares of the U.S. daily 
newspaper industry are only 3 and 6 percent respectively. These newspapers are regarded as particularly influential 
and informative not because they have a monopoly of the news market but because their market shares exceed those 
of most other daily newspapers.13  
Our working hypothesis is that earnings announcements dominate all or most alternative information 
sources individually and, thus, constitute an important information source. We regard the U.S. market for corporate 
information as being very competitive, with no single source likely to achieve the information monopoly benchmark 
R2 of 100 percent. However, information sources can differ greatly in their market shares. Finding that earnings 
announcements dominate other information sources individually would explain why earnings announcements and 
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earnings announcement returns in particular are heavily discussed and analyzed by both market participants and 
academic researchers.  
 
2.3 Our empirical approach 
We compare EADs’ R2 to the R2s of days associated with elevated levels of information arrival. In 
particular, we compare it to three sets of benchmarks: the R2s of (1) days on which firms announce dividends, (2) 
high-information arrival days, defined as days with the largest realized absolute returns in a firm-year, and (3) days 
on which firms disseminate earnings information through other channels: earnings forecasts, preannouncements, or 
SEC filings. We choose (1) dividend announcements because they are a distinctly non-accounting information event 
initiated by firms with the same regularity as, and often used as benchmarks for, earnings announcements; (2) days 
with the largest absolute returns because they are likely to achieve the highest R2s; and (3) days on which firms 
disseminate earnings information through other channels because firms are privileged suppliers of corporate 
information (we elaborate on these choices further in Section 4). While we primarily compare earnings 
announcements to other firm announcements, future research can examine non-firm sources of information to more 
completely characterize the supply-side of the corporate information market (Hopwood, 2009). 
Because sources disseminate information at different frequencies, it is not straightforward to compare their 
contributions. For example, many firms do not issue management forecasts every quarter, if at all. Analyzing only 
those firm-quarters in which managers issue forecasts, as Ball and Shivakumar (2008) do, is likely to overstate the 
importance of management forecasts relative to earnings announcements. Intuitively, holding the quality of the 
disseminated information constant, an information source that distributes information in fewer quarters makes a 
smaller contribution to the average annual flow of information. Conversely, ignoring the fact that some quarters 
have more than one management forecast is likely to understate the importance of management forecasts as an 
information source if we study price reactions to only one management forecast per quarter (if there are multiple 
management forecasts in a calendar quarter, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) include only the last forecast).14 
We address this empirical challenge as follows: When management forecasts occur K times per quarter, we 
sum returns over the corresponding K windows, in effect assuming that the total amount of information conveyed by 
these forecasts is the sum of the information impounded in prices on these days. The intuition is that the information 
8 
 
disseminated through two management forecasts in a quarter could have been disseminated through a single 
management forecast, whose price impact would have been the sum of the two price impacts.  
When management forecasts are absent from a quarter, we include one randomly chosen three-day return 
from that quarter. Intuition suggests that the absence of a management forecast is equivalent to issuing a forecast that 
has no price impact: Not providing a signal and providing a signal with infinite variance are equivalent insofar as 
beliefs regarding economic outcomes are not revised.15 Excluding observations when management forecasts are 
absent from a quarter, as Ball and Shivakumar (2008) do, amounts to excluding observations where uninformative 
forecasts are issued in a quarter—the end result is to overstate the importance of management forecasts as an 
information source.  
We treat preannouncements similarly to management forecasts. Our approach modifies Ball and 
Shivakumar’s (2008) approach of analyzing only firm-quarters with exactly one management forecast to yield an 
alternative empirical measure of importance of an information source that also depends on how often the source 
disseminates information. 
 
3. EADs’ R2 estimations 
3.1 Sample information and replication of Ball and Shivakumar’s (2008) main result 
Our primary sample includes all firm-year observations from 1972 to 2011 that satisfy two conditions. 
First, each calendar year must include exactly four quarterly earnings announcements. Second, calendar-year returns 
and three-day earnings announcement window returns must be available; the former are computed by compounding 
monthly returns and the latter by compounding daily returns over event days −1, 0, and 1, with day 0 being the day 
on which earnings is announced.16 We impose these conditions so that we can measure the fraction of the annual 
flow of priced information attributable to EADs, consistent with Ball and Shivakumar (2008). 
We estimate EADs’ R2 by estimating annual regressions of calendar-year returns on four earnings 
announcement three-day window returns. Panel A of Table 1 compares our sample estimates of EADs’ R2 to those 
from Table 2 of Ball and Shivakumar (2008).17 From 1972 to 2006, the sample period of Ball and Shivakumar 
(2008), our time-series mean of EADs’ R2 is 10.77 percent, almost the same as the Ball and Shivakumar (2008) 
estimate of 10.69 percent; for our full sample period, the mean EADs’ R2 is 11.08 percent.18 Our annual estimates 
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closely track the Ball and Shivakumar (2008) estimates—the correlation between the two is 0.9912; the maximum 
(minimum) of the difference between the annual estimates is 0.75 percent (−1.76 percent). Since our estimates are 
very close to those reported in Ball and Shivakumar (2008), we conclude that any differences in sample composition 
are insignificant. Thus, we expect our inferences are unlikely to differ from theirs purely because of data differences. 
 
3.2 Distribution of EADs’ R2 under the null hypothesis that EADs are informationally equivalent to four typical days 
We empirically explore the distribution of the EADs’ R2 under the null hypothesis that EADs are 
informationally equivalent to four typical trading days, which we refer to as the "Unimportance" null. From each 
firm-year, we randomly draw without replacement four days and estimate an annual regression of calendar-year 
returns on the four “announcement” returns whose three-day windows are centered on the randomly chosen event 
days. We choose these four days from two alternative samples of trading days: (1) the subsample that excludes 
earnings announcement window days, and (2) the full sample (which includes earnings announcement window 
days). This procedure is iterated 1,000 times to generate an annual R2 distribution. 
Our resampling approach differs from and extends Ball and Shivakumar’s (2008) approach of exploiting 
the temporal variation in annual R2s to test the null hypothesis that the time-series mean is equal to 4.8 percent—the 
expected R2 if daily returns are i.i.d. over time. Our approach is useful because the significance of earnings 
announcements may be time-varying. Also, our approach does not assume daily returns are i.i.d. over time but rather 
uses the realized distribution of daily returns to develop the benchmark. 
Summary statistics of the empirical distributions generated under sampling approaches (1) and (2) are 
reported in panels B and C of Table 1. Out of 40 years, we reject the null hypothesis at the one-tailed 10 percent (1 
percent) significance level for 39 (36) years in panel B and 39 (35) years in panel C. The high frequency of 
rejections suggests that EADs are informative throughout our sample period. Also, the mean of the empirical R2 
distribution is less than 4.8 percent and the empirical benchmark of 3.8 percent reported in Ball and Shivakumar 
(2008) for every year in the sample period (untabulated for brevity). We infer that the theoretical benchmark R2 of 
4.8 percent is too high because daily returns are not i.i.d. (e.g., French and Roll, 1986; Schwert, 1989) as assumed. 
These findings hold even if we follow Ball and Shivakumar (2008) in requiring that each benchmark day comes 
from a 13-week period surrounding an EAD and is on the same day of the week that earnings is announced.19 
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In sum, we find that the proportion of the total variation in annual returns explained by EADs is 
consistently higher than that associated with four typical days, and that the theoretical benchmark of 4.8 percent 
considerably overestimates the 3 percent actual proportion of information contributed by four typical trading days in 
our sample (panel C). 
 
3.3 Typical days' information content equivalent of EADs 
We previously assessed the importance of EADs by estimating four typical days’ R2 to match the four 
EADs’ R2 and then evaluating the difference in these R2s. An alternative approach is to determine how many typical 
days are needed to achieve an R2 that equals the EADs’ R2 of 11.08 percent. This alternative approach lets us 
compare EADs to other information sources in units of average trading days (e.g., French and Roll, 1986). We 
randomly select K typical days (K = 4, 8, 12 or 16) from each firm-year, form three-day “announcement” window 
returns around them, and then regress calendar-year returns on these K typical days’ returns. Panel D of Table 1 
tabulates the R2 distribution means for 4, 8, 12, and 16 typical days. As expected, the R2 increases with the number 
of days: the time-series mean R2 is 5.87 percent for 8 days, 8.69 percent for 12 days, and 11.44 percent for 16 days. 
Mean R2s for EADs and 16 typical days differ by less than 0.5 percent, as do their medians, which suggest that the 
proportion of the annual information associated with the four EADs is nearly equivalent to that associated with 16 
typical days. In other words, EADs are nearly four times as informative as the typical trading day.
 
4. Benchmarking EADs’ R2 against R2 of atypical days 
Our analyses in Section 3 compare EADs to typical trading days, and can be described as tests of the 
“Unimportance” null. In this section, we compare EADs to atypical days that are associated with increased arrival of 
information. These comparisons are motivated by our view that no information source is likely to achieve an R2 
approaching 100 percent but that some information sources contribute more to the annual flow of information than 
others. The null hypothesis guiding our analyses in this section is that earnings are important, which we refer to as 
the “Importance” null. 
 
4.1 Dividend announcement days’ R2 
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4.1.1 Motivation 
We select dividend announcement days because they are frequently used as benchmarks for EADs and also 
because dividend announcements are distinctly non-accounting events (e.g., Watts, 1973; Aharony and Swary, 1980; 
Damodaran, 1989; Sivakumar and Waymire, 1993). While we do not expect that dividend announcement days’ R2 
will exceed that of EADs, this estimate is a useful point of reference for evaluating EADs. The closer the dividend 
announcement days’ R2 is to 3 percent (11 percent), the greater (less) the importance of earnings announcements 
relative to dividend announcements. 
 
4.1.2 Results 
Table 2 compares EADs’ R2s to dividend announcement days’ R2s for different samples of dividend 
announcement days. For each sample, we report the mean number of observations as well as summary statistics on 
the R2 from the annual Ball and Shivakumar (2008) regressions. We reproduce the EADs’ R2 from Table 1 panel B 
as a benchmark in column 1 of Table 2. Columns 2 to 4 report results respectively for samples of (a) firms with 
exactly four ordinary (cash) dividend announcements per year, (b) firms with at least one ordinary dividend 
announcement in a year regardless of frequency (including announcements of special dividends), where we fill in for 
“missing” dividend announcements in a given calendar quarter with a randomly chosen day from that quarter and 
cumulate returns for all event days in quarters with multiple dividend announcements, and (c) all firm-years on 
CRSP, based on the preceding methodology where applicable. 
Comparing columns 1 and 2 which have exactly four announcement days each, we observe that EADs’ 
mean R2 of 11.08 percent is over 50 percent higher than dividend announcement days’ mean R2 of 7.25 percent, and 
that EADs’ R2 is higher in 34 (out of 40) years.20 We also find that the sample of dividend-announcing firms is 
smaller in every year, with the difference in number of observations widening from 1983, driven mainly by an 
increase in the EAD sample (not tabulated); this finding is consistent with the Fama and French (2001, 2004) 
observation that firms going public in recent decades are less likely to pay dividends. Notably, even though dividend 
announcements are voluntary compared to earnings announcements because firms do not have to pay common 
dividends, they appear to evoke a smaller market reaction conditional upon the announcement. 
12 
 
Column 3 expands the sample in column 2 to include all firms with at least one ordinary dividend 
announcement in a year. Comparing columns 2 and 3, we see that inclusion of firms with at least one ordinary 
dividend (and any special dividends) reduces the average dividend announcement day R2 slightly from 7.25 percent 
to 6.83 percent. This small R2 reduction suggests that the stock market reaction per dividend announcement day is 
greater for firms that pay dividends less frequently each year.21 
Finally, column 4 expands the dividend announcement sample to include all firms on CRSP. This analysis 
enables us to compare earnings and dividends as directly competing information sources for individual firms across 
the equity market, explicitly taking into account the intuition that dividends cannot be informative for non-dividend-
paying firms. We again “fill in” missing quarterly dividend announcement days with a randomly chosen trading day 
from that quarter. Consequently, the mean R2 is reduced to 3.80 percent, which is smaller than even the minimum R2 
for the EAD sample in column 1. EADs are more informative than broadly defined dividend announcement days in 
every year except 1999 (39 out of 40 years). 
In summary, the comparisons of earnings and dividend announcement days in Table 2 indicate that EADs’ 
contribution to the annual flow of information is about 50 percent larger than that of dividend announcement days 
for ordinary-dividend-paying firms alone. Furthermore, earnings announcements are about three times as 
informative as dividend announcement days when we consider both dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying 
firms. Thus, earnings announcements are a far more important information source than dividend announcements. 
 
4.2 High-information arrival days’ R2 
4.2.1 Motivation 
Days with the largest absolute realized returns in a calendar year are days on which the largest amount of 
priced information arrives, assuming that days with greater information arrival have higher return variance (Beaver, 
1968). This information can be of any type, accounting or non-accounting, and originate from any information 
source, public or private. As a way to benchmark the economic importance of the market reaction to earnings 
announcements, Francis et al. (2002) examine the extent of overlap between extreme absolute returns and earnings 
announcements. They report that the median absolute earnings announcement return falls in the top decile of daily 
absolute returns, and they conclude that earnings announcements are highly significant events to the equity market.  
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Similar to Francis et al. (2002), we view days with extreme returns as a benchmark against which to judge 
the importance of EADs as an information source. In particular, by identifying the four days in a firm-year with the 
largest absolute returns and estimating their associated R2, we get a sense for the maximum amount of new 
information that four event days can provide to the equity market. The R2 of such high-information arrival days is a 
sensible empirical upper bound against which to test our “Importance” null rather than a purely theoretical upper 
bound of 100 percent.  
We select four high-information arrival days (one from each quarter) in two different ways: by ranking the 
daily realized absolute returns of each firm-calendar year for (1) all trading days and (2) all trading days except 
those in the three-day earnings announcement windows.22 Including EADs in the ranking identifies the four most 
important trading days, while excluding EADs identifies the four most important non-EADs. We then construct 
three-day “announcement” window returns centered on these high-information arrival days, and we estimate 
regressions of calendar-year returns on these “announcement” returns. 
To get a better idea of the variability with which priced information arrives during a given year, we also 
estimate the proportion of the annual information flow associated with low-information arrival days, which are 
defined as days with the smallest realized absolute returns. We do not exclude EADs from the ranking of daily 
absolute returns in this case, as our primary focus is on characterizing information arrival during the year.23 
 
4.2.2 Results 
Table 3 reports R2s for EADs and high-information arrival days (after excluding, and alternatively 
including, EADs in the ranking of daily returns). We find that the mean R2 of high-information arrival days chosen 
among non-EADs is 8.50 percent, significantly lower than that of EADs, 11.08 percent. The mean R2 of high-
information arrival days chosen among all days, 10.76, is actually lower than that of EADs, but the difference 
between the two, 0.31 percent, is statistically and economically insignificant. We conclude that the contribution of 
EADs to the annual flow of information is unparalleled. 
Also, we document that the mean R2 of low-information arrival days is 2.43 percent, not much lower than 
the mean (median) R2 of 2.97 percent (2.84 percent) for typical trading days reported in panel C of Table 1. Since 
the mean and median typical trading days’ R2s are much closer to the low-information arrival days’ average R2 of 
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2.43 percent than the high-information arrival days average R2 of 10.76 percent, we infer that little information 
arrives on most trading days. In simple terms, these results confirm that the daily return distribution is fat-tailed 
(Fama, 1965), and that the few days with extremely large absolute daily returns explain a significant proportion of 
annual returns. 
 
4.3 Other earnings information announcement days’ R2 
4.3.1 Types of earnings information announcement days 
Firms distribute potentially price-sensitive earnings information not only on the days they announce 
earnings but also on the days they issue management earnings forecasts (e.g., Foster, 1973; Patell, 1976), 
preannounce earnings (e.g., Baginski et al., 1994; Soffer et al., 2000), file 10-K and 10-Q forms with the SEC (e.g., 
Foster, Jenkins, and Vickrey, 1983; Stice, 1991; Easton and Zmijewski, 1993), and amend these filings.24 We refer to 
these days as earnings information announcement days (EIADs henceforth). The nature of these information 
disclosures, however, varies substantially in terms of their content, timing, and consequence. For example, 
management forecasts, preannouncements, and even earnings announcements are best viewed as voluntary 
disclosures, while 10-K and 10-Q filings are mandated by the SEC. Also, earnings are typically announced with a 
press release, may be accompanied by the disclosure of some additional financial and non-financial information, and 
are invariably followed by the filing of 10-K and 10-Q forms that contain detailed financial and non-financial 
information. Thus, while the firm provides earnings information in all four cases, the nature and the circumstances 
of these disclosures vary so much that it is reasonable to view them as distinct types of information events or public 
sources of information. By assessing these events’ individual contributions to the annual flow of information, we 
provide new evidence on their importance as distinct ways of disseminating earnings information with pricing 
consequences. 
Ball and Shivakumar (2008) argue that the higher R2 of management forecast days stems from the 
forecasts’ voluntary nature in contrast to the mandated earnings announcements.25 To shed more light on the 
importance of discretionary vs. mandatory announcements, we examine 10-K and 10-Q filings with the SEC. 
Arguably, these filing days are the bona fide mandatory earnings announcement days, while formal EADs are 
merely customary or traditional. Furthermore, earnings are sometimes revised between the earnings announcement 
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date and the 10-Q filing (Hollie, Livnat, and Segal, 2005), with the implication that the latter is more definitive. 
Early studies failed to find significant market reactions to 10-K and 10-Q filings, but more recent studies find that 
electronic filings under the EDGAR system are informative.26 Thus, we examine how much information these 
mandatory quarterly filing days convey to the equity market. We differentiate between initial filings and later 
amendments because the latter are relatively infrequent and sometimes correct minor technical errors, even though 
they may also restate earnings. 
 
4.3.2 Results 
 Table 4 reports evidence on the significance of management earnings forecast days (panel A), earnings 
preannouncement days (panel B), 10-K and 10-Q filing days (panel C), and 10-K and 10-Q amendment days (panel 
D). The difference between preannouncements and management forecasts is that preannouncements are company 
earnings guidelines issued after the end of the forecasted fiscal period but before earnings are announced. 
Management forecasts and preannouncements are drawn from First Call, which starts coverage in 1993. We collect 
10-K and 10-Q filings and their amendments from EDGAR starting in 1994. 
We regress calendar-year returns on four three-day announcement window returns centered on an event of 
interest—for example, a day on which a management forecast is issued—with the two modifications described in the 
empirical approach subsection of Section 2, and also applied in our earlier dividend announcement analysis. If a 
calendar quarter does not have a particular event of interest, then we randomly pick a day in that quarter and 
construct a three-day window return centered on it for use as an independent variable. If a quarter contains multiple 
days with the event of interest, then we sum their three-day announcement window returns. 
First Call’s incomplete coverage of management forecasts and preannouncements (Chuk, Matsumoto, and 
Miller, 2012) is an important concern given our interest in comparing earnings announcements to management 
forecasts and preannouncements. We address this concern by checking whether our results hold in the period after 
1998, when coverage substantially improved, and in subsamples where coverage is likely more complete (firm-years 
with above-median analyst following, institutional ownership, and performance), as Chuk et al. (2012) recommend. 
In panels A and B of Table 4, we compare earnings announcements to management forecasts and preannouncements, 
respectively, over the period 1998-2011, and in a sample of firm-years with above-median analyst following.27 
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The first column in each panel reports EADs’ R2 for the same years to facilitate direct comparisons. 
Management forecasts are far less frequent than EADs, especially before 1998, although this difference may reflect 
gradual expansion of First Call coverage; however, even in the later period, only about one-third of firm-years 
contain any management forecasts (not reported in a table).28 When we examine only firm-years that contain at least 
one management forecast, we find a mean R2 of 20.87 percent, significantly higher than EADs’ R2. Since managers 
likely issue earnings forecasts only when the information is likely to change capital market beliefs (Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2008), it is not surprising that management forecast days’ R2 is high.  
When we assess the significance of management forecasts as an information source without conditioning 
on the issuance of a forecast, we document a mean R2 of 5.70 percent. The difference between the conditional mean 
R2 of 20.87 percent and the unconditional mean R2 of 5.70 percent is explained by the low frequency of 
management forecasts. Management forecasts make a substantial contribution to the annual flow of information only 
when they are disseminated. They are inferior to earnings announcements as an information source because of their 
lower frequency. The unconditional mean management forecast days’ R2 estimated on a sample of observations 
where First Call coverage is likely complete, firm-years with high (above-median) analyst coverage in the period 
from 1998 to 2011, is higher than 5.70 percent at 9.96 percent but still less than the mean EADs’ R2 of 12.14 percent.  
We conclude that incomplete coverage of management forecasts by First Call is an unlikely explanation for the 
difference in conditional R2s.  
Panel B conducts a similar comparison of earnings preannouncement days to EADs. The results are very 
similar to those reported in panel A, including the conditional mean R2s (20.46 percent vs. 20.87 percent). However, 
preannouncements occur less than half as frequently as management forecasts, and the gap between mean 
unconditional R2s (3.69 percent vs. 5.70 percent) is larger as a result. As in panel A, our conclusion is that firms 
choose to preannounce only when they have market-moving information, so we expect to find these days to be 
informationally important conditional on their occurrence. The unconditional mean preannouncement days’ R2 
estimated on a sample of observations where First Call coverage is likely complete is higher at 5.98 percent but still 
much less than the mean EADs’ R2 of 12.14 percent. Incomplete coverage of preannouncements by First Call is 
therefore an unlikely explanation for the difference in conditional R2s. 
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In comparing earnings announcements to 10-K and 10-Q filings, we consider only firm-years with four 10-
K and 10-Q filings. We report the results from this comparison in Panel C of Table 4. We find that 10-K and 10-Q 
filing days are approximately half as informative as EADs (mean R2 of 5.81 percent vs. 11.55 percent for EADs).  
Days when 10-K and 10-Q filings are amended convey even less information as evidenced by their mean R2 of 3.75 
percent (Panel D of Table 4).29  Overall, as an information source EADs dominate management forecast days, 
preannouncement days, 10-K and 10-Q filings days, and 10-K and 10-Q filing amendments days individually.   
 
4.4 Further analysis of the relative importance of earnings announcements  
4.4.1 Motivation 
We demonstrated that earnings announcements contribute more to the annual flow of information than 
management forecasts or preannouncements using Ball and Shivakumar’s (2008) R2 metric, mainly because 
earnings announcements vastly outnumber management forecasts and preannouncements. Earnings announcements 
are more prevalent because managers issue forecasts and preannounce earnings when their private information 
diverges sufficiently from the market’s information, but announce earnings every quarter regardless of whether 
earnings are anticipated by the market. Furthermore, forecasting or preannouncing earnings likely diminishes the 
information content of subsequent earnings announcements. These differences suggest that the average earnings 
release contains little new information; while when they occur, the average management forecast and 
preannouncement convey much new information (Kasznik and Lev, 1995). However, not all earnings 
announcements have low information content. Because earnings announcements are far more frequent, it is possible 
that the total number of high-information-content earnings announcements exceeds the total number of high-
information-content management forecasts and preannouncements.  
To explore this possibility, we pool size-adjusted announcement returns to form a single distribution, which 
we then partition into 30 bins of equal return width (4.79 percent).30 Each bin contains announcements with similar 
information levels. We use large event-day returns to identify announcements containing much information (Beaver, 
1968). We compare the frequency of earnings announcement returns to the frequencies of management forecast 
returns and preannouncement returns in the leftmost and rightmost bins to draw inferences about their relative 
importance as a source of market-moving information.  
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4.4.2 Results 
Panel A of Table 5 reports summary statistics for three-day-window size-adjusted returns for earnings 
announcements, management forecasts and earnings preannouncements, as well as for a combined sample in which 
days with multiple events are represented only once. The average three-day size-adjusted return for management 
forecasts and preannouncements are −0.69 percent and −3.73 percent, respectively, whereas the average earnings 
announcement return is 0.05 percent. The earnings announcement return distribution is slightly positively skewed 
(0.27) whereas the management forecast and preannouncement return distributions are equally negatively skewed 
(−0.54 and −0.63 respectively). These statistics are consistent with preannouncements and management forecasts 
being more likely to convey bad news to the market (e.g., Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Soffer et al., 2000; Hutton, Miller, 
and Skinner, 2003). The standard deviation of earnings announcement returns (8.29 percent) is less than that of 
management forecast returns (9.10 percent) and preannouncement returns (13.66 percent), consistent with earnings 
announcements on average containing less information than management forecasts and preannouncements. For our 
full sample period 1994-2011, the return distributions for preannouncements and management forecasts differ from 
the return distribution for earnings announcements in mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis at the 1 
percent level.31  Across subperiods, we find that the mean number of management forecasts and preannouncements 
increases but that the mean management forecast and the mean preannouncement returns decrease.   
In panel B of Table 5 we repeat these analyses on the subsample of firms with above-median analyst 
coverage where First Call coverage of management forecasts is likely to be complete.  We observe similar 
differences in the distributions of earnings announcement returns, management forecast returns, and 
preannouncement returns.   
Panel C of Table 5 reports the absolute and relative frequencies of earnings announcement, management 
forecast, and preannouncement returns in each of the 30 return bins. Figure 1 displays the proportion of observations 
in each bin that are attributable to earnings announcements, management forecasts, and preannouncements. Earnings 
announcements account for approximately 50 percent of the observations in bin 1, which contains the most extreme 
bad news announcements, and 90% of the observations in bin 30, which contains the most extreme good news 
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announcements. As a source of extreme good news, earnings announcements utterly dominate management forecasts 
and preannouncements combined.  
In Table 5 panel D we provide the same information for the subsample of firms with above-median analyst 
coverage during the period from 1998 to 2001 (where First Call coverage of management forecasts and 
preannouncements is more complete).  Earnings announcements now account for 26.67 percent of the observations 
in bin 1 and 68.42% of the observations in bin 30.  As a source of extreme good news, earnings announcements still 
dominate management forecasts and preannouncements combined. In passing, we note that preannouncements 
achieve their smallest share in bins 14 to 17, the bins with the smallest size-adjusted announcement returns, 
consistent with managers preannouncing only when they expect to move the market.  
We conclude that the role of earnings announcements as a source of extreme bad news is comparable to that 
of management forecasts and preannouncements, while the role of earnings announcement as a source of any other 
news is unequalled. The academic perception that earnings announcements are less informative than management 
forecasts arises because many earnings announcements are confirmatory, and as a result have limited or no 
information content. This makes the average earnings announcement less informative than the average management 
forecast or preannouncement, and masks the fact that far more earnings announcements are informative than any 
other firm announcements.   
 
4.5 R2 of all EIADs 
Next, we quantify the contribution of all earnings-related announcements to the annual flow of information. 
This is useful for two reasons. First, since these announcements are made by the firm, we are in effect assessing the 
role of the firm as a distributor of earnings information in the equity market. Second, by comparing EADs’ R2 to the 
R2 of all EIADs, we shed light on how important earnings announcements are as an information channel relative to 
several other information channels (management forecasts, preannouncements, and 10-K and 10-Q filings and their 
amendments) that firms use to convey earnings information to investors. Third, our approach of estimating the 
incremental R2s of non-EAD sources complements the Beyer et al. (2010) approach of allocating partial R2s from an 
extended regression that includes multiple information sources. 
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We modify our approach of regressing calendar-year returns on four earnings announcement three-day 
window returns as follows: When a firm disseminates earnings information on multiple days in a given quarter, then 
we use the sum of the three-day window returns centered on these days as our independent variable for that quarter.  
Results appear in Table 6, in which we only report findings for the period 1994 to 2011, when we have data 
on all the types of EIADs we consider. Column 1 reports EADs’ R2 after excluding observations where earnings 
announcements are accompanied by management forecasts, whereas column 2 includes these observations. Columns 
3 through 5 report EIADs’ R2, with earnings information announcement returns progressively modified to include 
returns on days on which earnings are preannounced, days on which earnings are forecasted, and days when 10-K 
and 10-Q forms are filed or amended. 
Comparing columns 1 and 2, we observe that EADs without concurrent management forecasts tend to have 
higher R2s (mean of 11.96 percent vs. 11.55 percent), which suggests that firms issuing management forecasts in 
conjunction with their earnings announcements are likely those whose earnings announcements are less informative 
(e.g., firms whose announcement content is more easily anticipated by the market).32 Column 3 has a mean R2 of 
12.61 percent, indicating that earnings preannouncements add 1.06 percent (= 12.61 – 11.55) R2 in information 
content across all firms, or approximately an extra 9 percent (= 1.06/11.55) over EADs’ information alone. Inclusion 
of management forecasts during the quarter increases R2 by 1.08 percent (= 13.69 – 12.61) and SEC filings or 
amendments add another 1.19 percent (= 14.88 – 13.69).33 In total, these other EIADs increase adjusted R2 by 3.33 
percent (= 14.88 – 11.55), or add about 29 percent (= 3.33/11.55) to EADs’ information. Put differently, EADs alone 
provide about 78 percent (= 11.55/14.88) of the information of all EIADs that we analyze.34  
In stark contrast, Beyer et al. (2010) estimate that earnings announcements provide 8 percent of accounting-
related information to the market whereas management forecasts and preannouncements account for 55 percent and 
11 percent, respectively, of the total accounting-related information flow. The large differences in estimates likely 
arise from a combination of Beyer et al. (2010) (a) restricting their analysis to about one-fourth of our sample with a 
likely bias towards large firms, (b) allocating common R2 for different information sources using a different 
algorithm, and (c) imputing missing events with abnormal stock return of exactly 0 instead of the return for a 
randomly drawn day. At a minimum, Table 6 suggests that the Beyer et al. (2010) results are highly sensitive to 
reasonable changes in methodology, and that researchers should resist drawing strong inferences from their results.   
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5. Concluding remarks 
We evaluate the informational role of earnings announcements in the equity market by comparing them to 
economically interesting benchmarks. We present evidence that earnings announcements explain a greater 
proportion of the variation in annual returns than dividend announcements, management forecasts, 
preannouncements, and 10-K and 10-Q filings and their amendments do after accounting for differences in event 
frequencies, and that no other four days in a year account for a larger proportion of the variation in annual returns 
than EADs. We infer that earnings announcements are a superior information source in the competitive corporate 
information market, in the sense that they convey more information than other information sources individually. 
Our study complements the work of Bamber et al. (2000), Ball and Shivakumar (2008), and Beyer et al. 
(2010) to paint a more complete picture of the informational role of earnings announcements. In particular, our 
comparison of EADs to high-information arrival days (which effectively “bounds” EADs’ R2 from above) is a 
natural complement to Ball and Shivakumar’s (2008) comparison of EADs to typical days (which effectively 
“bounds” the EADs’ R2 from below). In addition, we find that returns on management forecast days explain about 6 
percent of the variation in annual returns in the full sample. Our result differs from, yet complements, Ball and 
Shivakumar’s (2008) finding of an R2 in excess of 20 percent, obtained for a sample in which management forecasts 
are always issued. In combination, our results suggest that management forecasts convey a lot of information when 
disseminated, but due to their low frequency, they are inferior to earnings announcements as a market-wide source 
of information. We also find that management forecasts and preannouncements are an important channel for 
disseminating extreme bad news, but that they play a much smaller role in disseminating extreme good news. 
In closing, the value of an information source stems from the benefits information users derive from it. We 
suggest that this value is likely larger when an information source disseminates price-relevant information with high 
frequency, but do not advance a full-fledged theory on how these and other information source attributes map into 
information users’ welfare. We leave it for future research to develop such theories and use them to compare 
information sources at the aggregate level. 
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Notes 
 
1 We partition company-issued guidelines from First Call based on whether they occur before or after the end of the 
fiscal quarter to which the guidance pertains; we call the former management forecasts and the latter 
preannouncements (Baginski, Hassell, and Waymire, 1994; Soffer, Thiagarajan, and Walther, 2000). 10-K and 10-Q 
amendments include earnings restatements but also include other minor corrections. 
2 Beyer et al. (2010) reach a conclusion similar to Ball and Shivakumar (2008) using a parallel research design. 
However, Beyer et al. (2010) analyze only 70,700 firm-quarter observations for 2,747 firms over the period from 
1994 to 2007 while we analyze 276,180 firm-quarters for 11,823 firms over the same period, i.e., four times as 
many. Because Beyer et al. (2010) study only firms followed by financial analysts, their inferences likely apply 
primarily to large firms (e.g., Bhushan, 1989).  
3 Managers forecast and preannounce earnings primarily when their information differs sufficiently from the 
market’s expectation, whereas they announce earnings regularly regardless of market expectations (e.g., Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2008). Thus, managers forecast and preannounce earnings occur less frequently than they announce 
earnings, but this raises the possibility that extreme good news and bad news preannouncements and management 
forecasts occur more often than similarly extreme good news and bad news earnings announcements. 
4 Intuitively, one can view management forecasts as conveying only timely information and earnings announcements 
as conveying sometimes timely information and sometimes stale information. Our findings suggest that the number 
of earnings announcements conveying timely information is at least as high as the number of management forecasts 
conveying timely information. 
5 Our evidence is consistent with Francis, Schipper, and Vincent’s (2002) evidence that the majority of absolute 
earnings announcement returns fall in the top two deciles of daily absolute returns. We extend Francis et al. (2002) 
by using Ball and Shivakumar’s (2008) approach to measure the proportions of the variation in annual returns 
explained by earnings announcement returns and the four most extreme returns in a year.  
6 The pricing effect of earnings announcements may be overstated under this approach if earnings releases are 
associated with increased production of information by market participants or increased dissemination of other 
financial or non-financial information by firms.  
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7 EAD returns and non-EAD returns could be negatively correlated if investors overreact to earnings announcements 
(e.g., DeBondt and Thaler, 1985) or if transaction costs such as bid-ask spreads constrain daily price movements 
(e.g., French and Roll, 1986). 
8 In passing, we note that variance-based approaches in the tradition of Beaver (1968) do not require assumptions 
about how the market forms expectations about earnings—Earnings Response Coefficient-based approaches, 
however, require such assumptions. 
9 Ball and Shivakumar (2008) report that their results are robust to (a) return computation method (adding vs. 
multiplying), (b) outlier exclusion, (c) December fiscal year-end firms only, (d) annual return sign, (e) concurrent 
management earnings forecasts, (f) controls for size, market-to-book, leverage, and industry, (g) different 
announcement return windows, and (h) trading volume instead of returns. 
10 However, Abarbanell and Kim (2011) find that returns’ ability to predict future earnings is concentrated 
disproportionately on earnings announcement days.  
11 Bathke and Lorek (1984) estimate that unexpected quarterly earnings account for only 15 percent of the 
information that reaches the market on EADs and conclude (p. 175) “the results also underscore a lack of 
monopolistic control by the accounting profession over the dissemination of firm-specific financial information”. 
12 Examples include quality of financial reporting (Lev, 1989), information production in the preannouncement 
period by investors (Atiase, 1985), market efficiency (Bernard and Thomas, 1989, 1990), differential interpretation 
of information (Kandel and Pearson, 1995), disclosure practices in different countries (Bailey et al., 2003), and 
effects of changes in disclosure regulation (Heflin, Subramanyam, and Zhang, 2003). 
13 Their market shares are much smaller if one considers weekly and monthly magazines, radio, television, the 
internet, and gossip as competing suppliers in a more inclusive market for news. 
14 Ball and Shivakumar (2008) also examine the first (last) analyst earnings forecast revision after (before) each 
quarterly earnings announcement for the subsample of firms covered by I/B/E/S. They note that an advantage of 
their approach is that they can examine all forecast types, not just point and range forecasts. 
15 In contrast to our approach, Beyer et al. (2010) impute an abnormal stock return of exactly zero for every missing 
observation, which in our view artificially restricts the mean and variance of the signal on these days. 
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16 If earnings are announced on a non-trading day, day 0 is the first trading day after the announcement. Day +1 is 
often included to account for earnings announcements made after trading hours, while day −1 is included to account 
for potential leakage of information. Earnings announcement dates are extracted from the COMPUSTAT quarterly 
file and return data from the CRSP monthly and daily files. 
17 To be precise, we add 4.8 percent to the abnormal R2 numbers reported in Table 2 of Ball and Shivakumar (2008). 
They define abnormal R2 as the regression adjusted R2 value minus its expectation assuming i.i.d. daily returns, 
which they separately estimate as 4.8 percent. 
18 Dellavigna and Pollet (2009) find that, where I/B/E/S and COMPUSTAT earnings announcement dates differ, the 
earlier date is usually the actual date of the announcement. For the 1983-2011 subperiod, replacing the earnings 
announcement date from COMPUSTAT with an earlier one from I/B/E/S, when available, yields a marginally higher 
mean R2 of 11.58 percent. 
19 We did not impose these requirements because their effect is to produce an atypical sample. The sample would 
contain few trading days in proximity to each other, e.g., days that occur in the same calendar week or month; it 
would also likely be skewed toward certain days of the week. 
20 These results are based on samples that do not exclude observations with overlapping dividend announcement 
days and EADs. In untabulated analyses, on average, 4.39 (10.51) percent of firm-quarters (firm-years) have 
overlapping earnings and dividend announcement windows; excluding observations with overlapping windows 
results in a lower mean dividend announcement days’ R2 of 6.44 percent, so the likely effect of not excluding these 
observations is to make it more difficult to detect a difference in the R2s of EADs and dividend announcement days. 
21 Put differently, the conditional information content of dividend announcements by firms that pay dividends more 
frequently seems to be less than that for firms that pay dividends less frequently. Note that we “fill in” missing 
quarterly dividend announcement days with a randomly chosen trading day, which typically has a low R2 (see Table 
1). Including such random trading days in the second sample should have reduced the average R2 unless the actual 
dividend announcement days were more informative on average than those in the first sample. 
22 On average, 4.86 (16.77) percent of firm-quarters (firm-years) have overlapping earnings announcement and high-
information arrival windows. 
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23 Moreover, the return distributions of low-information arrival days with and without the inclusion of EADs are 
likely to be very similar as the overlap between EADs and low-information arrival days is likely minimal (Francis et 
al., 2002). 
24 In addition to management guidance for interim quarter earnings, we include annual earnings guidance issued 
during or after the fiscal fourth quarter as such guidance is equivalent to fourth quarter earnings guidance. 
25 However, when annual earnings announcements were voluntary before the SEC was instituted, they were not very 
informative to the stock market (Sivakumar and Waymire, 1993). A possible reconciliation is that earnings reports 
have become more credible over the last century. Similarly, Butler, Kraft, and Weiss (2007) find that the earnings 
timeliness of firms that voluntarily reported quarterly was no greater than that of those that only reported at the 
mandatory semi-annual frequency during 1955-69. The latter result is consistent with a self-selection argument in 
that only firms that would otherwise experience low earnings timeliness find it desirable to report earnings more 
frequently. 
26 Foster et al. (1983), Stice (1991), and Easton and Zmijewski (1993), among others, failed to find significant 
market reactions to 10-K and 10-Q filings with the SEC. However, more recent studies of the EDGAR filing regime 
find significant market reactions (e.g., Qi, Wu, and Haw, 2000; Asthana and Balsam, 2001; Griffin, 2003). The 
differing results are likely due to at least two factors: potential problems with identifying effective filing dates for 
the paper filing regime (i.e., when investors could only get paper copies of the filings) and limited access to the 
paper filings relative to electronic filings due to a cumbersome process for obtaining hard copies. 
27 We also perform the same analyses on observations with above-median institutional ownership (from Thomson 
Financial) and below-median number of quarterly losses in the eight quarters prior to the event quarter. The results 
are similar and are available from the authors upon request. 
28 Because of this infrequency, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) modify their approach and estimate a regression of 
calendar-quarter returns on three-day management forecast or preannouncement returns. We continue with an annual 
regression to facilitate combining the annual estimates for different earnings information channels later. 
29 Panel D of Table 4 presents results for an analysis of filing amendments using the same procedure that generated 
panels A and B. Filing amendments appear to be less informative than the initial filings, with a conditional mean R2 
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of only 3.75 percent. For robustness, we also assess the informativeness of restatements using announcement dates 
procured from the U. S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) for the 1997 to 2006 period. Compared with the 
results in panel D, the conditional mean R2 using U.S. GAO data is much higher at 10 percent for samples of 134 
firms on average, but the unconditional mean R2 is very similar at 3.17 percent. For brevity, these restatement results 
are not reported, but are available from the authors upon request. 
30 Announcement returns are adjusted for the holding period return of the corresponding CRSP size decile portfolio. 
Also, we exclude the top and bottom 0.5 percent of the combined size-adjusted announcement return distribution.  
31 We compute the distributional parameters for each announcement type quarterly, and use the time-series 
distributions of the parameters to test for differences. 
32 Ball and Shivakumar (2008) report that the R2 for a sample of EADs without contemporaneous management 
forecasts during 1994-2006 is slightly smaller than the R2 for their main sample of EADs during 1972-2006. 
Because they do not report an R2 comparison between all EADs and EADs excluding contemporaneous 
management forecasts for the same time period, their reported differences could reflect environmental changes 
during their sample period. 
33 We are likely understating the contribution of SEC filing days because we do not account for overlaps between 
SEC filing days and management earnings forecast days; i.e., to the extent they overlap, we assign all the 
explanatory power to management forecasts. 
34 Firms make other announcements that convey earnings information, such as writeoffs and restructurings (e.g., 
Bartov, Lindahl, and Ricks, 1998), mergers and acquisitions (e.g., Haw, Pastena, and Lilien, 1990), 8-K filings (e.g., 
Lerman and Livant, 2010), but these are relatively infrequent. In a few industries such as automobiles, firms release 
weekly sales numbers, while in a few other industries such as banking, railroads, and public utilities, there are 
additional mandatory regulatory filings. We expect these other announcements and filings to have minimal 
incremental impact on the total R2 in Table 6.  
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TABLE 1. Earnings announcement days’ (EADs’) R2 
 
Panel A compares sample estimates of EADs’ R2 to those from Table 2 of Ball and Shivakumar (2008), where the latter are obtained by adding 
4.8 percent—the expected value under the null hypothesis that daily returns are identically and independently distributed over time—to abnormal 
R2, defined in Ball and Shivakumar (2008) as R2 minus 4.8 percent. Column 2 is based on the same sample period as that in Ball and Shivakumar 
(2008) whereas column 4 is based on our full sample period. R2 is calculated from annual regressions of calendar-year returns on four earnings 
announcement three-day window returns. The sample comprises firm-years with available announcement dates in the COMPUSTAT quarterly 
file and return data in the CRSP monthly and daily files, and with exactly four announcements (four three-day window announcement returns). 
Calendar-year returns are computed by compounding monthly returns; announcement returns by compounding daily returns over the three-day 
window centered on the announcement day. Reported correlation is that between R2 of columns 1 and 2. 
Panels B and C juxtaposes our estimate of the EADs’ R2 and the empirical distribution (mean, median, 90th, 95th, and 99th percentiles) of the 
EADs’ R2 generated under the null hypothesis that EADs are informationally equivalent to typical days (“Unimportance” null). From each firm-
year we randomly draw without replacement four days and estimate an annual regression of calendar-year returns on the four “announcement” 
returns whose three-day windows are centered on the randomly chosen days. This procedure is iterated 1,000 times to generate an annual R2 
distribution under the “Unimportance” null. In panel B, we sample only from days outside earnings announcement windows whereas we sample 
from all days in panel C. ***, **, * refer to one-tailed statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level respectively. 
Panel D investigates the number of typical days required to achieve the EADs’ R2. From all days in each firm-year, we randomly draw without 
replacement K days and construct three-day window returns centered on each of these days. We then estimate an annual regression of calendar-
year returns on the K three-day window returns. This procedure is iterated 1,000 times and we report mean R2 for every sample year and for K = 
4, 8, 12, and 16. 
For brevity, the regression results by year are not reported; instead, all panels present only the summary statistics for these results. 
 
Panel A: Replicating Ball and Shivakumar’s (2008) main result 
 
 
 
Panel B: Empirical distribution of EADs’ R2 under “Unimportance” null (sampled days exclude EADs) 
 
 
 
Panel C: Empirical distribution of EADs’ R2 under “Unimportance” null (sampled days include EADs) 
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TABLE 1. Earnings announcement days’ (EADs’) R2, cont. 
 
Panel D: "Typical" days' information content equivalent of EADs 
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TABLE 2. Benchmarking EADs’ R2 against dividend announcement days’ R2 
 
This table contrasts EADs’ and dividend announcement days’ R2. Column 1 reproduces EADs’ R2 from Table 1. Column 2 analyzes firm-years 
with exactly four quarterly ordinary dividend announcements, and is based on R2s from annual regressions of calendar-year returns on the four 
dividend announcement three-day window returns. Column 3 analyzes firm-years with at least one ordinary dividend announcement, regardless 
of payment frequency (and including announcements for special dividends). A quarter with a “missing” announcement is “filled in” by randomly 
selecting a day from that quarter, and constructing a three-day window return centered on it. Column 4 analyzes the sample of all firm-years. 
Where there are multiple announcements in a given quarter, we cumulate three-day window returns across all such events, and daily returns of 
events with overlapping windows are not double counted. We do not require that dividend-paying firms be on COMPUSTAT. For brevity, the 
regression results by year are not reported; instead, only the summary statistics for these results are presented. 
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TABLE 3. Benchmarking EADs’ R2 against high-information arrival days’ R2 
 
This table benchmarks EADs’ R2 against those of high- and low-information arrival days. High-information arrival days are the four days in a 
firm-year with the largest absolute returns. We identify them in two ways—by ranking absolute daily returns in a firm-year after (1) excluding 
EADs and (2) including EADs. The R2 of high-information arrival days is obtained from an annual regression of calendar-year returns on four 
three-day window returns centered on these days. Low-information arrival days are defined analogously. The reported p-values are for tests that 
the time-series mean R2 of EADs does not differ from that of the corresponding benchmark. For brevity, the regression results by year are not 
reported; instead, only the summary statistics for these results are presented. The same sample was analyzed in column 4 of Table 1. 
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TABLE 4. R2s of management earnings forecast days, earnings preannouncement days, days with 10-K and 
10-Q filings, and days with filing amendments 
 
This table compares the EADs’ R2 to the R2 of days with management forecasts (panel A), preannouncements (panel B), 10-K and 10-Q filings 
(panel C), and filing amendments (panel D). The source of management forecasts and preannouncements is First Call. The difference between 
preannouncements and management forecasts is that preannouncements are company guidelines of quarterly earnings issued after the end of the 
forecasted fiscal quarter, but before earnings are announced. The source of 10-K and 10-Q filings is EDGAR. In panel A, we estimate 
management forecast days’ R2 on two samples. The first sample (column 3) includes those with exactly one EAD each quarter, whereas the 
second sample (column 4) includes only firm-years with management forecasts. We follow the same general approach of regressing calendar-year 
returns on four three-day announcement window returns centered on an event of interest—a day on which a management forecast is issued—with 
two modifications to account for the nature of the data. If a quarter does not have any management forecasts, then we randomly pick a day in that 
quarter and construct a three-day window return centered on it for use as an independent variable in our regression analysis. If a quarter has 
several management forecasts, then we sum their three-day window announcement returns. Panels B and D are constructed similar to panel A. 
For panels A and B, we further repeat the regression analyses on the two samples (columns 5 and 6) formed from applying the aforementioned 
sampling approaches to the subsample of firms in the 1998-2011 subperiod with above-median analyst coverage, where the source of analyst 
coverage is I/B/E/S. In panel C, we estimate the R2 of filing days on a sample of firm-years with four filing days as very few firms have fewer 
than four events per year. Panels C and D are based on 1994-2011 data. For brevity, the regression results by year are not reported; instead, only 
the summary statistics for these results are presented. 
 
Panel A: Management earnings forecast days 
 
 
 
Panel B: Earnings preannouncement days 
 
 
 
Panel C: 10-K and 10-Q filing days 
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TABLE 4. R2s of management earnings forecast days, earnings preannouncement days, days with 10-K and 
10-Q filings, and days with filing amendments, cont. 
 
Panel D: 10-K and 10-Q filing amendment days 
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TABLE 5. Descriptive statistics for empirical distributions of size-adjusted event returns 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for three-day-window size-adjusted returns associated with earnings announcements, management forecasts, and preannouncements, using the Table 4 samples 
for the respective events, conditional on observing the event. Announcement returns are adjusted for the holding period return for the corresponding CRSP size-decile portfolio. The “Combined” sample 
includes all firm-events, but firm-days on which multiple events occur are represented only once. Abnormal returns less than the 0.5th percentile or greater than the 99.5th percentile of each sample are 
omitted from the analyses. Panel A presents the median and the first four moments of the abnormal return distribution for each sample. The mean, median and standard deviation returns are reported as 
percentages, whereas skewness and kurtosis are numbers. ***, **, and * refer to statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level respectively for two-tailed t-tests of equality of a 
moment for a given event return distribution and the corresponding moment for the earnings announcement return distribution, where these moments are estimated at the quarterly level. Panel C presents 
the absolute and relative frequencies corresponding to each of 30 equal-sized abnormal return bins, formed on the “Combined” sample. Lower and upper return bounds for each bin are percentages. 
Panels B and D are constructed analogously to panels A and C, respectively, but for the subsample of firms in the 1998-2011 subperiod with above-median analyst coverage, where the source of analyst 
coverage is I/B/E/S. 
 
Panel A: Distribution properties 
 
 
 
Panel B. Distribution properties for high analyst coverage subsample 
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TABLE 5. Descriptive statistics for empirical distributions of size-adjusted event returns, cont. 
 
Panel C: Empirical distribution 
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TABLE 5. Descriptive statistics for empirical distributions of size-adjusted event returns, cont. 
 
Panel D: Empirical distribution for high analyst coverage subsample (1998-2011) 
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TABLE 6. EADs’ R2 improvement from including days with earnings forecasts, preannouncements, and 10-
K and 10-Q filings or their amendments 
 
This table reports EADs’ R2 after broadening the notion of earnings announcement days. Column 1 analyzes the sample of formal EAD but 
excludes observations where management forecasts occur concurrently on the announcement day, whereas column 2 includes these 
observations. Columns 3 through 5 progressively includes days on which earnings are preannounced, forecasted, and 10-K and 10-Q forms are 
filed or amended. We modify our approach of regressing calendar-year returns on four three-day window earnings announcement returns as 
follows: When earnings information is disseminated over multiple days in a given quarter, then we use the sum of the three-day window returns 
centered on these days as our independent variable. For brevity, the regression results by year are not reported; instead, only the summary 
statistics for these results are presented. 
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Figure 1. Relative abnormal event return frequencies 
 
 
